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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper presents data on corruption and impartiality from a unique survey with local politicians 
in Sweden, which includes answers from about 78 percent of the 13 361 politicians active in the 
290 Swedish municipalities. On the basis of a number of questions related to impartiality and 
corruption, and after checking for respondent perception bias, we construct three indices: one bri-
bery index, one partiality index and one recruitment index. The paper also assesses the external 
validity of these indices, using previous surveys, crime statistics and media reports on corruption. 
Our main conclusion after these analyses is that the indices hold water, and thus that it is wort-
hwhile to include them in future, more explanatory studies on both causes and consequences of 
corruption and impartiality in Sweden. 
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Introduction 
Sweden is one of the countries with the lowest corruption levels in the world and is also much 
cleaner from corruption than it used to be (Rothstein and Teorell 2012; Transparency International 
2012). It is therefore tempting to conclude that corruption and lack of impartiality are not relevant 
problems for Sweden. Such a conclusion is however probably flawed.1 
Recently, several reports have concluded that, although Sweden in comparison with other countries 
is spared from the worst excesses of corruption, it does exist and varies considerably across the 
country (Andersson 2012; Bergh et al. 2013; Statskontoret 2012). What is more, several corruption 
scandals have been exposed during the 2010s. The most well known was uncovered in the second 
largest city in Sweden, Gothenburg, and resulted in a huge scandal (Wångmar 2013). As a conse-
quence, the City of Gothenburg appointed a special commission of inquiry to investigate the rea-
sons behind this scandal.  Their analyses were hampered by the lack of comparative data, however, 
and conclusions drawn from the inquiry were therefore quite idiosyncratic. For example, it pointed 
out the culture of leadership in Gothenburg as the main reason behind the scandal, which makes it 
hard for the results to travel (Amnå, Czarniawska and Marcusson 2013).  
There are thus good reasons to study Sweden on its own merit, but perhaps even more important, 
there are also good reasons to move from the more cross-country comparisons mainly used in this 
line of research to the sub-national level. As theories in this field are often developed and tested on 
the same cases, we should look at new, and different, data on which to test established theories. 
Are, for example, the internationally established explanations for corruption and impartiality, such 
as economic, cultural and institutional factors also what explain variation in Sweden, or do we need 
to take other, maybe more particular, considerations into account in a very low corrupt country? 
(See for example Treisman 2007; and Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012 for overviews.) 
If we could answer these questions, we would not only learn something about the Swedish case but 
also about how general existing theories are. The same is probably true when it comes to conse-
quences of corruption and lack of impartiality. The comparative literature has clearly shown that 
the costs of corruption in human health, subjective happiness and economic growth are huge (see 
                                                     
1 We would like to thank Statskontoret, and especially Johan Mörck, for generously sharing their data. We would also 
like to thank Gissur Erlingsson for his support of the project; Jan Teorell for constructive comments on earlier drafts of 
this manuscript; Mikael Gilljam and David Karlsson for inviting us to participate in KOLFU, and for very valuable com-
ments on our items in the survey and on a draft of this manuscript. Finally, we owe special thanks to the Quality of 
Government Institute for making our participation in KOLFU possible. 
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Holmberg, Nasiritousi and Rothstein 2009 for an overview). But, is this also true within the same, 
and relatively well functioning system, such as in Sweden? Within country variation of corruption 
and impartiality provides a welcome opportunity to put questions like this to empirical tests. 
A skeptic might think that Sweden would not be a good case for studying within country variation, 
but there are at least three conclusions from previous research that speak against this objection. 
First, as mentioned, corruption also exists in Sweden even though levels are relatively low (Bergh et 
al. 2013; Statskontoret 2012). Second, corruption in Sweden seems to be a more pressing issue on 
the local than on the national level. Normally, national or supranational levels are considered to be 
the most corrupt in the eyes of the general public. It is the other way around in Sweden. Compared 
to other countries, even the neighboring Nordic states, the local level sticks out as relatively corrupt 
(Linde and Erlingsson 2013). Third, the variation in corruption across the country seems relatively 
large. For instance, in some municipalities, respondents of an elite survey answered that there were 
no problems, while respondents in other municipalities answered that politicians were often offered 
bribes, that public procurement was conducted partially, and that they could easily get perks for 
themselves or their friends if they wanted to (Bergh et al 2013:131). 
To make it possible for us and other researchers to address these and similar questions, we com-
piled a number of indicators of corruption and impartiality at the municipality level. The data come 
from a unique survey and include answers from about 78 percent of the 13 361 politicians active in 
the 290 Swedish municipalities. In absolute numbers, 10 491 politicians answered the questionnaire 
(Gilljam and Karlsson 2013). 
There are however recent studies on corruption in Sweden that use an approach similar to ours. In 
2008 and 2011, a group of researchers associated with the Tillit och korruption i lokalpolitiken (Trust 
and corruption in local politics) research project and Statskontoret (Swedish Agency for Public Man-
agement) ran two surveys on the municipal level (Bergh et al. 2013; Statskontoret 2012). Although 
there are several similarities between our approach and theirs, there are also important differences. 
First, we try to directly measure both impartiality and corruption, while the previous studies focus 
mainly on corruption. Second, the populations in the two studies are different, both in size and 
scope. We include all politicians in the municipal council in the population, and send our survey out 
to everyone in that population, which means that the number of respondents in our study is much 
larger. The other research group includes only the chairperson and the vice chairperson of the mu-
nicipality executive board, and the chairperson of the municipality council. However, they also 
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include four top placed civil servants for each municipality. As a consequence, we can only tap into 
the experiences of the politicians; on the other hand, the previous studies need to rely on between 
one and seven answers for each municipality, while we have between 13 and 68 respondents. Third, 
it is probably fair to say that the approach of these previous studies is more elite, viewing the inter-
viewees as informants, while our approach is more inclusive and respondent oriented. All in all, we 
believe that, while previous studies are very valuable, our study adds both a new measure of impar-
tiality and a number of respondents so that it is meaningful to discuss levels in individual municipal-
ities.  
The goals of this paper are rather limited. It takes a first, but for any analyst interested in the data, 
important step by describing the data collection process and evaluating the quality of the data. What 
is more, we build three indices, one of the levels of partiality and two relating to corrupt practices: 
one for bribery and one for non-meritocratic recruitment of civil servants. Ideally these indices can 
be used as either dependent or independent variables in coming studies of the causes and conse-
quences of corruption on the local level in Sweden. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way: first, we describe the data collection pro-
cess in more detail, including the design of the survey and its underlying rationale. Second, we ex-
amine response frequencies and potential respondents’ perception bias. We conclude this section 
by suggesting three indices of partiality, bribery and recruitment in Swedish local governments. In 
the third section, we validate the indices against another similar survey, as well against objective 
indicators. Fourth, and finally, we summarize our findings.   
Data collection 
It is hard to design accurate and comparable measures of corruption and impartiality. The main 
reason is of course that corruption is illegal and impartiality is a strong norm in most modern socie-
ties. Actors involved therefore have strong incentives to hide what they are doing, which makes 
research on the prevalence of corruption difficult. Moreover, not long ago, several scholars were 
doubtful of the negative consequences of corruption and even argued that criticism of corruption 
exhibited signs of moral panic (Leff 1964; Nye 1967). 
For these reasons, there were long no broad comparisons in corruption and impartiality, and cor-
ruption research was thus based merely on case studies. This changed during the 1990s, and the 
international research community has taken several steps towards broader comparisons, mainly 
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between countries, but to some extent also over time. Very simplified, corruption and impartiality 
have been measured in three different ways (for a more detailed summary of the existing corruption 
measures and the criticism against them, see Teorell 2010): first, and probably most common, are 
the perception based measures, among which Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index (CCI) are the best known. Both indices are 
based on a large number of underlying sources, including perceptions of the level of corruption 
made by experts, businessmen and the general public (Transparency International 2012; Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Masturuzzi 2009). Although often used in research, they are also widely criticized (see 
for example Anderson and Heywood 2009). Second, experience-based measures have been used 
more and more in the last years. One example of this is a large survey to more than 30 000 Europe-
an citizens (Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein 2013). This survey asks ordinary citizens about their 
experience of, for example, paying bribes in their contact with police, schools and the health sector. 
Critiques of the perception-based measures often prefer the experience-based measures (Treisman 
2007). Third, and finally, there are different versions of more objective measures. These can be 
constructed for example from convictions in corruption cases (Chang, Golden and Hill 2010), me-
dia reports (Nyblade and Reed 2009) or “kick-back” costs in infrastructural construction projects 
(Golden and Picci 2005). 
Based on these experiences on the international level and on what we already know about the Swe-
dish case, we opted for a data collection strategy of a broad web survey with Swedish politicians at 
the local level. 
The survey was conducted in 2012-2013, and the total population was 13 361 persons. E-mail ad-
dresses to all politicians were collected through contacts with local government offices, national, 
regional and local party organizations and, finally, through phone contact with politicians them-
selves. After an initial e-mail containing the link to the survey together with a round of e-mail re-
minders, non-responding politicians were contacted by telephone. Respondents who preferred to 
respond on a paper questionnaire were given the opportunity to do so. The ambitious data collec-
tion strategy yielded an average response rate of 78 percent, with over 50 percent respondents in 
288 of the 290 municipalities, making it a unique survey of all local politicians in a Sweden (Gilljam 
and Karlsson 2013). In total, the survey included 60 questions on a broad set of topics. The ques-
tions related to corruption and impartiality were a minor part of the questionnaire and were placed 
close to the end. 
 7 
Theoretically, we tried to capture both impartiality and corruption. Impartiality in the exercise of 
public power has been suggested to be the basic norm for high quality institutions and has largely 
influenced the debate in recent time (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; but see also North, Wallis and 
Weingast 2009). At the same time, there are only a few examples of research in which impartiality is 
actually measured (see however Rothstein and Teorell 2012 for an exception). When it comes to 
corruption, we start from the standard definition used by most empirically oriented researchers in 
this field, namely that corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman 
1978; Treisman 2000).  
Two different batteries of questions are used to measure the concepts. In both cases we wanted to 
come as close to the respondents’ own experience as possible, without losing too many respond-
ents. As corruption is illegal and impartiality is highly normative, we were afraid that questions di-
rectly related to the respondent would yield extremely low response rates and small variation (basi-
cally no one would be expected to admit having been involved in illegal activities). Previous surveys 
on the same topic in Sweden had struggled with both of these problems (Bergh et al. 2013; 
Statskontoret 2012). For instance, in surveys 2008 and 2011 where local politicians and civil serv-
ants were asked how often they were offered bribes, only 0.2 (2008) and 0.1 (2011) percent an-
swered “very often” or “reasonably often”, while 99.5 (2008) and 99.3 (2011) percent answered 
“never” or “very seldom” (Bergh et al. 2013).   We therefore tried to strike a balance between utiliz-
ing the central positions of our respondents, and thus tapping into their experience of how the 
municipality works, without asking about their personal involvement.  
The impartiality battery starts with a definition of impartiality and continues to ask about the extent 
to which allocation of apartments in public housing, building permits, environmental permissions, 
public procurement and recruitment of public servants were made in an impartial manner in the 
municipality, on a five-point scale, where 1 indicates little impartiality and 5 indicates much impar-
tiality.2 
The corruption battery has five items, with different statements about abuse of public office in the 
municipality. Two of them are directly related to taking or paying bribes. The survey asks, for ex-
ample, to what extent it has occurred that a businessman offered a bribe to an official that was 
                                                     
2 In Swedish: ”Med opartiskhet menas att inga ovidkommande hänsyn tas när beslut fattas, till exempel till individer, 
företag eller grupper. I vilken utsträckning uppfattar du att följande typer av ärenden behandlas opartiskt i din kom-
mun?”. 
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handling a public procurement during this election term. Another question asks to what extent it 
occurs that an official takes bribes for services included in her job.3  
We included two further batteries in the survey. The first tries to capture the corruption risk, and 
thus asks about the extent to which it would be hypothetically possible for someone in the re-
spondent’s position to influence implementation, policy or public procurement (again we use five 
items). The second instead measures the attitude to corruption, and therefore asks how acceptable 
the respondent thinks a set of questionable claims related to corruption is.4 These two batteries of 
questions are however not analyzed in this paper. See the appendix or the full questionnaire (in 
Swedish). 
As mentioned in the introduction, our approach has both differences from and similarities to earlier 
studies. The most striking difference compared to the most comprehensive studies in Sweden is 
probably that our study also measures impartiality (compare with Bergh et al. 2013; Statskontoret 
2012).  We are closer to the earlier studies when it comes to the corruption indicators, but also here 
there are some differences. We have, on the one hand, because of the risk of a low response rate, 
chosen not to ask questions directly about how often the respondent is offered a bribe but, on the 
other hand, tried to tap into the respondent’s experience of how the municipality works.  We have 
also a much larger sample than previous surveys, which only included at most seven respondents 
from each municipality, while we have up to 68 (Bergh et al. 2013). Moreover, the population dif-
fers between our study and the previous ones. While we focus only on local politicians, they also 
include some top civil servants.  
Compared to the international studies of corruption and impartiality, our approach has both per-
ception and experience based elements. However, it does not involve any objective measures. In a 
subsequent section we therefore validate our indicators against some external sources. These in-
clude both perceptions and experiences measured through surveys, legal cases of corruption and 
media reports. Before we look more closely at the external validity, however, the next section will 
describe the results of the survey more deeply, investigate whether there are any perception biases 
and suggest three indices.  
                                                     
3 In Swedish: ”Enligt din uppfattning, i vilken utsträckning har följande förekommit i din kommun under mandatperi-
oden?” 
4
 In Swedish: ”  potetiskt sett, i vilken utstr  kning skulle en politiker i din position, med dina kontakter i kommunen, ha 
m  lighet att”  and, ”Enligt din uppfattning, i vilken utstr  kning kan f l ande  eteenden vara a  epta la?” 
 9 
Description of data 
We now turn to an analysis of the results of the data collection. We proceed in four steps. First we 
look closer at the “no opinion” alternative, which was available for the respondents answering the 
corruption questions. Second we discuss the general distribution of the answers. Third, we analyze 
the correlation between different items in the impartiality and corruption batteries and suggest three 
indices. Using these indices we, fourth, test for respondent perception bias. 
The response alternative “no opinion” was offered for the corruption questions but not for the 
impartiality questions. The reasons were, based on experiences of previous studies in the same area 
(Bergh et al. 2013; Statskontoret 2012), both that we considered the corruption questions quite 
controversial and that we thought that most of our respondents would not have had any experience 
of corruption. We were therefore worried that forcing them to choose an answer would produce a 
low response rate and/or flawed estimates. 
 
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR QUESTIONS IN THE SURVEY, INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL  
 Valid N Mean SD No op. No 
resp. 
Impartiality (1=Partial, 5=Impartial)      
Recruitment 8567 3.33 1.22  4% 
Procurement 8584 3.70 1.22  3% 
Housing 8383 3.71 1.23  6% 
Building permits 8613 3.85 1.20  3% 
Environmental permits 8567 3.89 1.17  4% 
      
Corruption (1=Not at all, 7=To a very large extent)       
A politician has attempted to influence a public administration report 6412 4.11 2.11 26% 3% 
A civil servant has been employed despite not being the most qualified 
candidate 
6030 3.45 2.15 29% 3% 
A former politician has been employed in a leading position in the public 
administration or in a publically owned company 
6319 2.63 2.09 20% 3% 
A businessperson has offered a gift or service to a civil servant in connec-
tion with a public procurement 
5028 1.82 1.46 42% 3% 
A public employee has demanded payment for performing a service that is 
part of his or her duties 
5199 1.59 1.25 40% 3% 
Comment: The valid N column is the number of respondents when no responses and no opinion are excluded. The no response 
column is the percentage of persons that did not answer the specific question but did answer subsequent questions, and the no 
opinion column is the percentage of persons that answered the question with the no opinion answer. 
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Table 1, above, gives the summary statistics for all the survey questions and among other things 
shows the proportions of respondents that chose the “no opinion” response and the proportion 
that abstained from the question but still answered subsequent questions on impartiality and cor-
ruption. 
The “no opinion” option puts us in a dilemma. Should these answers be included in the analysis or 
excluded from it?  This is especially important, as the proportion of “no opinion” answers is rela-
tively high for the corruption questions: especially the two questions concerning bribery, where 
about 40 percent of the respondents chose “no opinion” (see Table 1 below). Ideally, the persons 
that chose the “no opinion” response should be persons that are unable to make a good assessment 
of how common the practice is in the local government. In such a case, excluding the “no opinion” 
responses would lead to a more accurate measure based on the remaining responses. An indication 
that this interpretation is correct is that valid responses are much more common among members 
of the municipal board. Respondents that chose the “no opinion” alternatives are therefore exclud-
ed from the analysis.  
We now proceed to analyze the distribution between the different response alternatives more gen-
erally. The survey questions in Table 1 are ordered according to the reported level of lack of impar-
tiality and corruption. Among the impartiality questions, recruitment and procurement are per-
ceived to be the most partial, while decisions on building and environmental permits are perceived 
to function in a more impartial way. The mean values for all questions are above the midpoint of 3.  
Among the corruption questions, the means are generally quite low on the scale from 1 to 7. Only 
one question has a mean value above the midpoint of 4, which is that ”a politician has attempted to 
influence a public administration report”. It might be because this is a relatively mild form of abuse, 
compared to taking bribes for example, but it can also be caused by an unintended ambiguity in the 
question. While it is not permitted to unduly influence civil servants during the process of writing 
the report (which was the purpose of the question), it is of course allowed to influence the report in 
the instructions to the civil servants. The two items from the corruption questions below the item 
concerning illegitimate influence relate to the recruitment score, but the two questions above that 
relate to outright bribery. In turn, bribery is perceived to be very uncommon. The mean value for 
the question of whether a public servant has demanded an extra payment is 1.59, very close to the 
low endpoint on the scale. This is not surprising; the low levels confirm findings of previous studies 
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on Sweden (Bergh et al. 2013; Statskontoret 2012) and correspond to the generally low number of 
reported corruption scandals. 
However, the primary focus of this paper is to construct measures at the municipal, not the indi-
vidual, level. By way of question design, most of the questions should be indicative of characteris-
tics of the local government, not of the individuals responding to the questions. Before turning to 
correlations among the questions, we therefore aggregate the responses in each municipality. Table 
2 shows the correlations between the municipal averages for each question. The rectangles in the 
matrix highlight the correlations between survey items in the same battery. 
 
TABLE 2. CORRELATION MATRIX BETWEEN MUNICIPAL AVERAGES OF SURVEY 
QUESTIONS 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Housing  .62 .67 .57 .41 -.12 -.10 -.20 -.11 -.18 
2 Building permits .62  .87 .61 .45 -.26 -.13 -.21 -.26 -.22 
3 Environmental permits .67 .87  .72 .51 -.24 -.15 -.27 -.23 -.23 
4 Procurement .57 .61 .72  .66 -.26 -.19 -.30 -.24 -.26 
5 Recruitment .41 .45 .51 .66  -.32 -.34 -.60 -.24 -.21 
6 
A politician has attempted to influence a public 
administration report 
-.12 -.26 -.24 -.26 -.32  .22 .41 .41 .30 
7 
A former politician has been employed in a 
leading position in the public administra-
tion or in a publically owned company 
-.10 -.13 -.15 -.19 -.34 .22  .57 .28 .24 
8 
A civil servant has been employed despite not 
being the most qualified candidate 
-.20 -.21 -.27 -.30 -.60 .41 .57  .27 .26 
9 
A businessperson has offered a gift or service 
to a civil servant in connection with a pub-
lic procurement 
-.11 -.26 -.23 -.24 -.24 .41 .28 .27  .61 
10 
A public employee has demanded payment for 
performing a service that is part of his or 
her duties 
-.18 -.22 -.23 -.26 -.21 .30 .24 .26 .61  
 
Overall, correlations are strongest in the different types of questions: the impartiality questions 
correlate well with the other impartiality questions, and the corruption questions correlate with the 
other corruption questions. This could both be indicative of the questions being part of the same 
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batteries in the survey, and therefore phrased similarly and grouped together, but could also indi-
cate tapping into underlying phenomena. 
We now proceed to conduct a factor analysis on the questions to construct our indices. Factor 
analysis of all survey item averages yields the same dimensions as when doing the analysis on each 
battery separately. Results of the two factor analyses are shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
TABLE 3. FACTOR ANALYSIS ON IMPARTIALITY QUESTIONS: FACTOR LOADINGS 
 
Factor 1  
Recruitment 0.78  
Procurement 0.87  
Housing 0.92  
Building permit 0.86  
Environmental permit 0.71  
Comment: Principal component factor analysis. N=290. Variance explained: 69%. 
 
TABLE 4. FACTOR ANALYSIS ON CORRUPTION QUESTIONS. 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
A politician has attempted to influence a public administration report 0.53 0.40 
A businessperson has offered a gift or service to a civil servant in con-
nection with a public procurement 
0.87 0.15 
A public employee has demanded payment for performing a service that 
is part of his or her duties 
0.86 0.09 
A civil servant has been employed despite not being the most qualified 
candidate 
0.18 0.87 
A former politician has been employed in a leading position in the public 
administration or in a publically owned company 
0.12 0.85 
Comment: Principal component factor analysis. N=290. Variance explained: 70%. Varimax rotation with 
Kaiser normalization. 
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Three factors can be distinguished from all the questions: one for impartiality, one for bribery and 
one for recruitment. Among the corruption questions, two items concern recruitment load on one 
dimension, while the two concerning bribery load on the other.  
The question about whether a politician has attempted to influence a report loads on both. This is 
another indication that there might be something peculiar with the question. Taken together with 
the ambiguity of the question discussed above, we would not recommend using this item for fur-
ther analysis.  
We do not use predicted factor scores when we construct the indices, however, since the factors 
will then be orthogonal to each other, which is theoretically unlikely. Instead, we construct simple 
additive indices and divide by the number of questions. The corruption question that loaded on 
both dimensions is excluded, both in order to keep the remaining indexes theoretically coherent 
and because of the ambiguity of the wording of the question mentioned above. Moreover, we re-
verse the impartiality questions so that higher values on the resulting index, as on the two other 
indices, reflect bad behavior. It is thus a partiality index. Table 5 presents the correlations between 
the indices. 
TABLE 5. CORRELATION MATRIX OF MUNICIPAL LEVEL INDEXES 
  1 2 3 
1 Partiality index - 0.29 0.33 
2 Bribe perception index .29 - 0.33 
3 Recruitment perception index .33 0.33 - 
 
As expected, the partiality index is positively correlated with the other two indices, which in turn 
are positively correlated with each other. All correlations are significant at the 95 percent level. 
As a next step, we investigate possible sources of perception bias among the respondents. To make 
this analysis, we again analyze the individual level but use only the indices (here calculated at the 
individual level), controlling for municipality fixed effects. We include a variable indicating whether 
the respondent is a full member of the municipal board, and therefore has more power and insight 
into the affairs of the local government. Another important variable included is whether the re-
spondent is a part of the ruling majority in the municipality. The expectation is that politicians in 
the ruling majority will perceive to a lesser extent a lack of impartiality and corruption, in line with 
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the large body of research showing that people tend to be politically motivated in their reasoning 
(Tabor and Lodge 2006). Furthermore, as previous research has identified publically owned enter-
prises as a potential danger zone for corruption (Bergh et al. 2013), we include a variable for 
whether the respondent is a member of the board of a public company and therefore could be 
expected to have more insight, if the hypothesis formed in previous research is correct. What is 
more, variables for gender, age, education and party are also included. Results are presented in Ta-
ble 6 on the next page. 
Strong effects are found for the municipal board variable: members of the board perceive less par-
tiality and corruption. How should these figures be interpreted? On the one hand, the persons in 
the municipal board should have more insight into the affairs of the local government. On the oth-
er hand, they also have a vested interest since they are responsible for the local government policy. 
We get a hint of the underlying reasons from the extremely strong effects of the majority variable: 
members of the ruling majority perceive substantially less partiality, abuse and corruption. For in-
stance, the predicted difference between the opposition and the majority on the recruitment index 
is one whole point on the scale, about one half standard deviation. Given that there are no apparent 
reasons for why the ruling majority should have better insight into the actual state of affairs, the 
effect must be interpreted as an example of politically motivated reasoning, which also casts light 
on the municipal board variable. 
No substantial general effects are found for the gender, education and public company variables, 
but older politicians perceive fewer problems. The party effects are interesting, as virtually all re-
ported coefficients go in the direction of parties perceiving more corruption and partiality than the 
reference category, the Social Democrats. This is possibly indicative of politically motivated reason-
ing, as the Social Democrats in many municipalities have been in power for a long time, even 
though they are currently in opposition in many municipalities. The Sweden Democrats and other 
parties (usually local parties only represented in one municipality) are more especially pessimistic 
about the state of affairs, which is hardly surprising given that they have the character of anti-
establishment parties (which is partly true of the Green party as well). Their representatives have 
also been shown to have lower levels of interpersonal trust than representatives of other parties 
(Gilljam, Karlsson and Sundell 2010). 
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TABLE 6. ESTIMATION OF POTENTIAL PERCEPTION BIAS: OLS REGRESSION WITH 
MUNICIPAL LEVEL FIXED EFFECTS, ABSOLUTE T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES 
 Partiality perception Bribes perception Recruitment perception 
Municipal board 
-0.262*** 
(10.76) 
-0.105*** 
(2.94) 
-0.288*** 
(6.00) 
Majority 
-0.474*** 
(21.05) 
-0.364*** 
(10.57) 
-1.112*** 
(24.19) 
Public company 
-0.0211 
(0.75) 
-0.0687 
(1.69) 
-0.00724 
(1.32) 
Man 
-0.122*** 
(5.42) 
0.0174 
(0.50) 
-0.0847 
(1.83) 
Age 
-0.00426*** 
(4.73) 
-0.00575*** 
(4.09) 
-0.0125*** 
(6.58) 
College education 
-0.0485* 
(2.07) 
0.0104* 
(0.29) 
0.141* 
(2.97) 
Party (ref: Social democrats)    
Left 
0.269*** 
(5.31) 
-0.0153 
(0.19) 
0.351*** 
(3.36) 
Green 
0.269*** 
(5.31) 
0.409*** 
(4.90) 
0.847*** 
(7.50) 
Center 
0.0886* 
(2.32) 
0.0726 
(1.27) 
0.340*** 
(4.45) 
Liberals 
0.0495 
(0.90) 
-0.0175 
(0.22) 
0.399** 
(3.66) 
Christian Democrats 
0.176*** 
(3.93) 
0.187** 
(2.73) 
0.816*** 
(8.89) 
Moderates 
0.0878** 
(2.92) 
0.0798 
(1.75) 
0.553*** 
(9.05) 
Sweden Democrats 
0.563*** 
(8.49) 
0.507*** 
(4.37) 
1.246*** 
(8.04) 
Other parties / no party 
0.442*** 
(7.18) 
0.636*** 
(6.69) 
1.181*** 
(9.78) 
Constant 
2.859*** 
(51.49) 
2.100*** 
(23.88) 
4.016*** 
(34.08) 
N 8186 4665 5540 
R2 within 0.11 0.06 0.18 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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All in all, the analyses reported in this section have resulted in three different indices: one on par-
tiality, one on bribery and one on recruitment. The analysis of perception bias reveals some system-
atic effects of respondent characteristics, but only one large enough to merit special attention: the 
one of being a part of the ruling majority or not. In the subsequent section on external validation, 
we therefore perform validation analyses separately for the measures calculated only on the majority 
and on the opposition, as well as for the total group of respondents. 
External validation 
The distributions of our three indices are presented in the histograms in Figure 1. High values 
mean perceptions of more partiality, bribery and improper recruitment. 
FIGURE 1. HISTOGRAMS FOR THE THREE INDICES 
 
A common feature of all the three distributions is that there are a few municipalities that stand out 
towards the “bad” end of the spectrum, while the distribution is thicker towards the “good” side of 
the distribution, especially for the bribe index. It is therefore warranted to focus more attention on 
the municipalities that stand out as not as well functioning rather than on the municipalities with 
the least amount of corruption. The reason is that differences on the good side of the spectrum are 
probably less meaningful. 
For the bribe index, the top four are Solna, Norrköping, Falun and Gothenburg, which are munici-
palities where there have been highly publicized corruption scandals in the last few years, all in rela-
tion to building projects. In the case of Solna, which is at the very top, a highly ranked politician 
 17 
and the top civil servant were charged with taking bribes from the company in charge of building 
the new Swedish national athletic arena. Only the top civil servant was convicted, for receiving 
close to one million Swedish kronor for a board post financed by the building company. 
But does the validity of the bribe index hold up in systematic tests? To investigate this, we correlate 
the bribe index against three external data sources. Ideally, we would of course want to validate all 
three of our indices, but we have only found good external points of validation for the bribe index. 
The first of the external reference points is another survey with local politicians conducted in 2011, 
with similar questions (Bergh et al. 2013). A high correlation between our measures and the 
measures from the other survey may not be indicative of high validity, but rather of the stability of 
the measures. As the same politicians answered both surveys, a weak correlation would instead be 
very troubling and indicate that the survey responses are more random. Data were obtained from 
the Swedish Agency for Public Management (Statskontoret). 
The survey was directed to both civil servants and politicians, but we choose to make comparisons 
only with the responses of politicians, as only politicians are included in our survey. Specifically, we 
compare our bribe index with the mean value of a question in the other survey: “How often do you 
think that other politicians and civil servants in your municipality are offered money or other bene-
fits in order for them to take a decision that benefits the person or persons that gave the offer?”. 
The response alternatives were “never”, “very seldom”, “quite seldom”, “quite often” and “very 
often”. Figure 2 shows the correlation between our index (x-axis) and the other survey question (y-
axis).  
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FIGURE 2. CORRELATION BETWEEN BRIBE PERCEPTIONS IN OUR SURVEY AND THE 
SURVEY BY STATSKONTORET 2011 
 
There is a positive and statistically significant correlation (r=0.23) that is also robust to removing 
the four outliers to the right in the graph. The correlation may seem quite weak, but it should be 
kept in mind that the number of respondents per municipality is considerably lower in the previous 
survey, which should lead to more random variation. It is therefore reassuring that there at least is a 
significant correlation in the right direction.  
Two more reference points are available for the bribery index. First, we ran a search in local news-
papers for articles containing mentions of bribery and municipality during the period between 
2010-10-01 and 2012-09-01, which is the same period that the survey questions ask about. Each 
newspaper was then associated with one municipality, according to the headquarters and primary 
focus of the newspaper (Karlström 2012). Using this method, 51 newspapers could be assigned to a 
specific municipality. Nationwide newspapers were excluded from the analysis. We investigate the 
correlation between the log of the number of articles about bribery and the bribe perception index. 
Moreover, as the perception bias analysis revealed that the most important source of bias was 
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whether the respondent was part of the ruling majority or not, we also divide the responses into a 
majority and an opposition index and perform the correlation analysis separately on each index. 
The results are presented in Table 7. 
TABLE 7. CORRELATION BETWEEN BRIBE PERCEPTION INDEX AND LOCAL  NEWS-
PAPER ARTICLES ABOUT BRIBERY. N IN PARENTHESES.  
 Ln(Local newspaper articles about 
bribery) 
Bribe perception index total 0.55*** 
(51) 
Bribe perception index opposition 0.55*** 
(51) 
Bribe perception index majority 0.41** 
(51) 
  
There is quite a strong and highly significant correlation between the number of newspaper articles 
about bribery and the perception index. In municipalities where politicians perceive that there have 
been more instances of bribery, the local newspapers also write more articles about bribery. An 
interesting aspect is that the opposition’s perceptions correlate more strongly with the newspaper 
measure than the majority’s perception, as could be expected given that the majority has an interest 
in underestimating abuse and corruption. However, the correlation between the opposition index 
and the newspaper measure is not stronger than between the total index and the newspaper meas-
ure. Figure 3 graphically presents the correlation between the total index and the newspaper meas-
ure  
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FIGURE 3. CORRELATION BETWEEN BRIBE PERCEPTIONS INDEX AND NEWSPAPER  
ARTICLES ABOUT BRIBERY 
 
The second reference point is crime statistics. This is an approach with apparent drawbacks, as only 
discovered corruption will be included in the statistics, but it has been used in earlier research (Mei-
er and Holbrook 1992; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Golden and Picci 2005). We use data from the Swe-
dish National Council for Crime Prevention, a Swedish government agency, on public officials 
charged with taking a bribe in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. The raw numbers are of course relat-
ed to the size of the municipality: the two municipalities where there have been most charges are 
the two largest cities, Stockholm (14) and Gothenburg (13). However, adjusting for population size 
is not appropriate either, since the size of the public administration is not directly proportional to 
the size of the population, as all municipalities regardless of size need to provide a minimum of 
services. We therefore also use a dummy variable for whether there has been at least one charge 
against a public official during the time period. The correlations are presented in Table 8. 
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TABLE 8. CORRELATION BETWEEN BRIBE PERCEPTION INDEX AND BRIBE CHARGES 
2010-2012. N IN PARENTHESES. 
 Number of bribe charges 
2010-2012 
At least one bribe charge 
2010-2012 
Bribe perception index total 0.42*** 
(290) 
0.40*** 
(290) 
Bribe perception index opposition 0.38*** 
(289) 
0.33*** 
(289) 
Bribe perception index majority 0.22*** 
(290) 
0.25*** 
(290) 
   
Again, there are relatively strong and highly significant correlations, both between the number of 
charges and with the simple dummy indicator. Similar to the newspaper measure, the opposition’s 
perceptions have a stronger correlation with the external data, but the perceptions of the opposi-
tion and majority combined provides the strongest correlation. Figure 3 displays the predicted 
probability (from a logistic regression) that at least one official will have been charged with taking a 
bribe as a function of the bribe perceptions index. 
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FIGURE 4. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF AT LEAST ONE BRIBE CHARGE AS A FUNC-
TION OF THE BRIBE PERCEPTIONS INDEX 
 
Taken together, there seems to be a decent correspondence between the bribe perceptions index 
and external indications of bribery. Even though it is not possible, based on this analysis to ascer-
tain which one of the data sources is closest to the true value, we think it is encouraging that they 
point in the same direction. Our main conclusion from this section is therefore that the indices 
suggested in this paper actually tap into a real world phenomenon in a systematic manner and thus 
merit further attention in empirical studies, even if they can not be interpreted as a perfect indicator 
of real-world corruption. 
Summary 
This paper presents data on corruption and impartiality from a unique survey of local politicians in 
Sweden that includes answers from about 78 percent of the 13 361 politicians active in the 290 
Swedish municipalities (Gilljam and Karlsson 2013). On the basis of a number of impartiality and 
corruption related questions, and after checking for respondent perceptions bias, we construct 
three indices: one bribery index, one partiality index and one recruitment index. Moreover, the 
 23 
paper assesses the external validity of these indices, using previous surveys, crime statistics and 
media reports on corruption. 
Our main conclusion after these analyses is that the indices hold water, and thus that it is worth-
while to include them in future, more explanatory studies on both causes and consequences of 
corruption and impartiality in Sweden. 
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IMPARTIALITY QUESTIONS 
 
 
CORRUPTION QUESTIONS 
 
 
 27 
OPPORTUNITY AND ACCEPTANCE QUESTIONS (NOT ANALYZED IN THIS PAPER). 
 
 
